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The pogrom of 1905 in Odessa: a case study 
Robert Weinberg 
The wave of anti-Jewish pogroms that swept the Pale of Settlement 
after Tsar Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto in I 905 reflected 
the ethnic and political tensions and hostilities that characterized 
popular unrest and marred the social landscape of late Imperial 
Russia in that revolutionary year. 1 In the weeks following the 
granting of fundamental civil rights and political liberties, pogroms 
directed mainly atJews but also affecting students, intellectuals, and 
other national minorities broke out in hundreds of cities, towns, and 
villages, resulting in deaths and injuries to thousands of people. 2 
In the port city of Odessa alone, the police reported that at least 
400 Jews and roo non-Jews were killed and approximately 300 
people, mostly Jews, were injured, with slightly over 1,600 Jewish 
houses, apartments, and stores incurring damage. These official 
figures undoubtedly underestimate the true extent of the damage, as 
other informed sources indicate substantially higher numbers of 
persons killed and injured. For example, Dmitri Neidhardt, City 
Governor of Odessa during the pogrom and brother-in-law of the 
future Prime Minister Peter Stolypin, estimated the number of 
casualties at 2,500, and the Jewish newspaper Voskhod reported that 
over 800 were killed and another several thousand were wounded. 
Moreover, various hospitals and clinics reported treating at least 600 
persons for injuries sustained during the pogrom. 3 Indeed, no other 
city in the Russian Empire in 1905 experienced a pogrom 
comparable in its destruction and violence to the one unleashed 
against the Jews of Odessa. 
Despite the havoc wreaked by these pogroms, historians have only 
just begun to explore the origins, circumstances, and consequences of 
the October pogroms in an effort to evaluate their impact and 
connection with the general course of revolutionary events in r 905. 4 
Even though the general contours of pogroms in Russia are known, 
detailed case studies are nonetheless required if historians are to offer 
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a more comprehensive and conclusive assessment of antisemitism 
and the pogromist phenomenon in late Imperial Russia. This 
chapter focuses on Odessa for several reasons. First, Odessa was the 
fourth largest city in the Russian Empire by century's end, boasting 
a Jewish populalion of approximately 138, oo in a city with 403,000 
inhabitants. Second, Lhe op and breadth of the viol nc directed 
against Odessa J wry merit special study. Third, since ethnicity 
oft n acted as a divisive force in labor movements in many parts of 
Western Europe and Russia during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the ethnic heterogeneity of the Odessa work 
force provides an opportunity to study how ethnic and religious 
antagonisms affected worker solidarity and the capacity for collective 
action in I 905. 5 Finally, examination of the Odessa pogrom addresses 
the broader issues of the Revolution of r 905, particularly the 
character of worker unrest and protest and the dynamics of 
revolutionary politics. The fact that the pogroms followed quickly on 
the heels of major concessions offered by the autocracy strongly 
ug ests that they were conn Cled to the political crisis ngulfing 
Russia in r 905 and should th refore be examined in the ont xt of 
the social, economic, and political strains threatening the stability of 
state and society in late Imperial Russia. 
Pogrom analysis raises two especially perplexing issues, namely 
how to identify pogromists and their motives and how to pinpoint 
the specific reasons for the outbreak and timing of pogroms. While 
members of various social and occupational groups often engaged in 
acts of anti-Jewish violence and behaved out of varying motives, is 
it possible t det rmin whi h re ident f Od s a wer particularly 
pron to pogromist beha ior in r905 nd why th y figured 
pr min ntly in atta k onjew and their prop rty? Given the lon 
heritag of anti ·emitism in des a t.hal in luded periodic oulbreaks 
of violent attacks against Jews, why did anti-Jewish violence surface 
only in the aftermath of the October Manifesto and not earlier in the 
year during other instances of social and political unr st? The 
0 tober pogrom in Odessa also underscores the importance of 
studying popular and official attitudes towardJews and asse sing the 
extent to which the pogrom was a spontan ous display of popular 
antisemitism or the result of a carefully planned and premeditated 
strategy engineered by government officials. 
The October 1905 pogrom in Odessa resulted from the con-
juncture of sev ral long-term and short-term social, economic, and 
political factor that produced conditions in the autumn of r 905 
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parti ularly rip for an explosi n of anti-Jewish violen . Among th 
lo.ng-t rm fa ·tor wer economic comp tition between enain 
ategories of Gentile and Jewish" ork rs - un killed day laborers in 
parti ular - long-standing thni and religiou ancagonisms the 
promin nee of J w in the commercial affair of Odessa and the 
mistr atm nl of J ews as i.t was rnanife ted b the central go ernm nt 
and lo a l autb ritie in discriminatory legislation and p lici . More 
imm diate factors in Jude th gen ral our of p litical vents and 
developments in 1 905, spe ifically th polarization of the poli ti al 
p ctrum int pr a nd anti- overnment forces th role of ivilian 
and military offi ial in promoting an atmo ph r condu iv to a 
pogrom and the visible po ilion of J ws in th opposition mov ment 
against the autocracy. An xamination of ir umstan e. leading up 
to th p grom and an analy i f tb chain of events that trigg r d 
th · attack n the J ws of tb city unders ore how the pogrom gr w 
out of general developments in Odes a in 1905 and was an int gral 
element in the trajectory of th r volu tion. The pogrom ·annot b 
und rstood apart fr m th c mplex natur of so ial e onomi 
thnic and p Iitical lif' in Odessa. 
Founded in the waning years of the reign of Catherine the Great, 
Odessa was a relatively new city that did not inhibit but rather 
n ourag d a ll resid nts - Russians and non-Russian , for ign rs 
a nd J ws - Lo participate a tiv ly in its economi d velopm nt. 
dessa was an nlight ned ity that tolerated diversity and 
innovation welcoming p rson of all nationalities " ho ould 
contribute to the growth of the city. Greeks, Italians, and Jews 
helped set the tempo of commercial and financial life .in Odessa and 
assumed a tive role in th ity' ultural and politi a l affairs during 
mu h of th nin te nlh c · ntury. J w wer especially welcome in 
Ode a and were exempt from many of the onerous burdens and 
restrictions that coreligionists in other areas of the Pale of Settlement 
endured. 
But this tol ranc did not m an lhatJews in Od ssa were a cepted 
a so ial equa ls or that antisemitism did not exist in lhe ity. 
Notwithstanding Od ssa s w II-des rved r putation a a ba lion of 
Jib ral and en light ned attitudes t ward it J wish resident the 
J ews of d ssa wer no trangers lo anti-Jewish animo ity, ' hich 
g nerally remained ubm r d but did as ume ugly and iolent 
form ev ral times before 1905. Seriou. pogrom· in which Jew wer 
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killed and wounded and Jewish houses and businesses suffered 
substantial damage had occurred in 1821, 1859, 1871, 1881, and 
1900. Anti-Jewish sentiment was common among Odessa's Russian 
population, a gangs of Je\ ish and Russian youths ft n ngaged in 
bloody brawl . Every year at Eastertime rum r of an imp nding 
pogrom circulat d through the city's J wi h community. Pogrom-
mongering intensified aft r the turn of the century as militantly 
patl'i.otic and pro-tsarisl organizati n emerged and engaged inJew-
baiting and other ant..isemiti acliviti s. 6 
These pogroms stemmed in part from deep-rooted anti-Jewish 
feelings and reflected a Judeophobia prevalent among many non-
J wish re idents of the city. Such was the case in the 182 1 pogrom 
when Greeks attacked Jews, accusing them of aiding the Turks in 
killing the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople. After mid-century, 
however, religious fanaticism and hatred sometimes mixed with 
social and economic factors to heighten anti-Jewish sentiments. The 
increasing prominence of Jews in the commercial life of the city and 
structural changes in the economy played no small role in fueling 
antisemitism and leading to its expression in pogroms. 
Until the Crimean War, Greeks controlled the export of grain from 
Odessa, while Jews dominated the roles of middleman and expediter. 
With the disruption of trade routes caused by the war, many of the 
leading Greek commercial firms either went bankrupt or decided to 
pursue other more lucrative ntures.Jewish m rchants and traders, 
who were accu tomed to op rating at small · r pr fit margins, filled 
the vacuum caused by the departure of Greek merchants and 
assumed prominent positions in the export business in Odessa, which 
was overwhelmingly dependent on the grain trade. Like other ethnic 
and religious communities in the city, Jewish merchants gave 
preference in employment pra tices to their oreligionists. Conse-
quently, Greeks were supplanted by Jewish work r and fell into 
straitened economic circumstances. 7 These developments, along 
with rumors of a Jewish ritual murder in 1859 and desecration of the 
Greek Orthodox Church and cemetery in I 871, fanned the flames of 
antisemitism, driving many Greeks, sailors and dockworkers in 
particular, to participate in pogroms in these years. 
Greeks were not the only residents of Odessa who perceived Jews 
as an economic threat. Russian resentment and hostility toward Jews 
came to the fore in the pogrom of I 871 as Russians joined Greeks in 
attacks on Jews. Thereafter, Russians filled the ranks of pogromist 
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mobs m 1881, 1900, and 1905. The replacement of Greeks by 
Russians as pogromists reflects the decline of Greek influence in 
Odessa and underscores the tension and hostility that also existed 
between Russians and Jews in the city.8 
According to some Russian inhabitants, exploitation by and 
competition with Jews figured prominently as the causes of the I 871 
pogrom. Some insisted that "the Jews exploit us," while others, 
especially the unemployed, blamed increased Jewish settlement in 
Odessa for reduced employment opportunities and lower wages. 
One Russian cabdriver, referring to the Jews' practice of lending 
money. to Jewish immigrants to enable them to rent or buy a horse 
and cab, com plained : " Several years ago there was one Jewish 
cabdriver for every 100 Russian cabdrivers, but since then rich Jews 
have given money to the poor Jews so that there are now a countless 
multitude of Jewish cabdrivers." 9 
The growing visibility of Jews enhanced the predisposition of 
Russians to blame Jews for their difficulties. Like elsewhere in Russia 
and Western Europe, many non-Jews in Odessa perceived Jews as 
possessing an inordinate amount of wealth, power, and influence 
and pointed to the steady growth of the city's Jewish population 
during the nineteenth century - from approximately 14,000 ( 14 
percent) in 1858 to nearly 140,000 (35 percent) in 1897 - as an 
indication oftheJewish "threat."10 The increasingly prominent role 
played by Jews in the commercial and industrial life of the city after 
mid-century also contributed to resentment against Odessa's Jewish 
community. In the 1880s, for example, firms owned by Jews 
controlled 70 percent of the export trade in grain, and Jewish 
brokerage houses handled over half the city's entire export trade. 
Jewish domination of the grain trade continued to expand during 
the next several decades; by I g Io Jewish firms handled nearly go 
percent of the export trade in grain products. In addition to their 
activities as merchants, middlemen, and exporters, Jews in Odessa 
by century's end also occupied prominent positions in the manu-
facturing, banking, and retail sectors. In I g IO Jews owned slightly 
over half the large stores, trading firms, and small shops. Thirteen of 
the eighteen banks operating in Odessa had Jewish board members 
and directors, while at the turn of the century Jews comprised 
approximately half the members of the city's three merchant guilds, 
up from 38 percent in the mid- I 88os. Jews virtually monopolized the 
production of starch, refined sugar, tin goods, chemicals, and 
l 
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wallpaper and competed with Russian and foreign entrepreneurs in 
the making of flour, cigarettes, beer, wine, leather, cork, and iron 
products. Even though Jews in 1887 owned 35 percent of all 
factories, these firms produced 57 percent of the total factory output 
(in roubles) for that year. 
Despite the outstanding success of some Jews in economic pursuits, 
the common perception that the growing Jewish presence threatened 
to result in total Jewish domination had little basis in reality. The 
proportion of Jews in the city's population, which had risen from 
about a quarter to a third during the last quarter of the century, 
leveled out after 1897, with the percentage of Jews somewhat 
dropping by the eve of 1905. According to data assembled by the city 
governor, the number of Jews living in Odessa in 1904 was 
approximately 140,000, or just over 28 percent of the city's total 
population. The reasons for this decline are difficult to ascertain but 
may be due to imprecise census-taking by local officials, since other 
studies state that the percentage of Jews in Odessa still remained 
above 30 percent in 1904.11 Regardless of slight variations in 
estimates of the size of the Odessa Jewish community at the turn of 
the century, non-Jews continued to hold their own in the economic 
sphere and were in no danger of being eliminated by Jewish 
entrepreneurs and industrialists. According to the l 897 census, 
thousands of Russians and Ukrainians were engaged in commercial 
activities of some sort, especially the marketing of agricultural 
products, and comprised approximately a third of the total number 
of individuals listed as earning livings from trade. Moreover, on the 
eve of 1905 approximately half the licenses granting permission to 
engage in commercial and industrial pursuits were given to non-
Jews, and in l9IO non-Jews owned slightly under half the large stores 
and trading firms and 44 percent of small shops. Forty percent of 
manufacturing enterprises in l 887 were owned by foreigners, with 
Russians owning another 25 percent. On the eve of the First World 
War foreigners and Russians, many of whom employed primarily 
Russian workers, owned the majority of enterprises under factory 
inspection in Odessa. Lastly, Jews in l9IO owned only I7 percent of 
real estate parcels in the city, down from 20 percent a decade earlier, 
while Gentiles controlled about half of all large commercial 
enterprises. The bulk of the wealth in Odessa still remained in the 
hands of non-Jews. 12 
Furthermore, wealthy Jews could not enter the leisured propertied 
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class or translate their wealth into political influence and power. 
Contrary to popular perceptions prevalent among non-Jews in both 
Odessa and throughout Russia, Odessa was not controlled by its 
Jewish residents. Only a handful of Odessa's Jews lived from 
investments in land, stocks, and bonds, and even fewer - 71 in a staff 
of 3,449 - worked for the imperial government, the judiciary, or the 
municipal administration. This was due in part to the 1892 
municipal reform which made it more difficult for Jews to occupy 
government posts and disenfranchised RussianJewry, who no longer 
enjoyed the right to elect representatives to city councils. A special 
office for municipal affairs was assigned the responsibility of 
appointing six Jewish members to the sixty-man Odessa city 
council. 13 
In contrast to the wealthy and influential stratum of Jews, which 
never constituted more than a fraction of the total Jewish population 
of Odessa, the vast majority of Jews eked out meager livings as 
shopkeepers, second-hand dealers, salesclerks, petty traders, dom-
estic servants, day laborers, workshop employees, and factory hands. 
Poverty was a way oflife for most Jews in Odessa, as it undoubtedly 
was for most non-Jewish residents. Isidor Brodovskii, in his study of 
Jewish poverty in Odessa at the turn of the century, estimated that 
nearly 50,000 Jews were destitute and another 30,000 were poverty-
stricken. In 1905 nearly 80,000 Jews requested financial assistance 
from the Jewish community in order to buy matzoh during Passover, 
a telling sign that well over half the Jews in Odessa experienced 
difficulties making ends meet. 14 
Despite the disparity between popular perception and the reality 
of Jewish wealth and power, a reversal in Odessa's economic fortunes 
at the turn of the century strengthened anti-Jewish sentiments 
among its Russian residents. Russia entered a deep recession as the 
great industrial spurt of the 189os faltered. In turn, Odessa's 
economy suffered a setback due to the decrease in the demand for 
manufactured goods, the drop in the supply of grain available for 
export, and the drying up of credit. Weaknesses and deficiencies in 
Odessa's economic infrastructure complicated matters. Conditions 
continued to deteriorate as the year 1905 approached, due to the 
outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904. Trade, the 
mainstay of Odessa's economy, declined even further and the city's 
industrial sector entered a period of retrenchment. 15 
Although anti-Jewish sentiments in Odessa usually remained 
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submerged, many residents feared that Russian-] ewish hostilities 
could explode in a matter of hours given the right combination of 
factors. During major labor demonstrations or strikes, organizers 
often felt compelled to exhort workers not to direct their anger at 
Jews, but to present a united front of Jew and Russian against 
employers. More important, organizers had to allay fears among the 
general public that demonstrations and strikes might develop into 
pogroms. As one Russian worker assured the Odessa Jewish 
community in early l 905, Russian workers were not "wild animals 
ready to unleash a pogrom." 16 The fear that strikes and demon-
strations would degenerate into antisemitic violence even served to 
curb labor militancy. For example, the 1903 May Day rally never 
materialized because many potential participants, Jews and Russians 
alike with the memory of the recent Kishinev pogrom fresh in their 
minds, feared that a march through Odessa would spark a pogrom. 
In fact, a group of Jewish shopkeepers and property owners, upset by 
workers gathering in a field to celebrate May Day, informed the 
police, who arrested some thirty workers.17 Employers also under-
stood that religious animosities could be used to hinder worker 
solidarity; owners of the few enterprises with ethnically mixed labor 
forces sometimes encouraged Russian workers to direct their anger 
at Jewish coworkers.18 Ethnic loyalties and hatreds of Russian 
workers sometimes overshadowed their affinities to Jewish workers 
based on the common exploitation and oppression both groups 
experienced as wage laborers and permitted ethnic tensions to 
surface. 
During the first half of 1905 tensions between Jews and Russians ran 
particularly high. Fomented in part by the popular belief that Jews 
were not contributing to the war effort against the Japanese, anti-
J ewish hostility nearly reached a breaking point in the spring. 19 As 
in previous years rumors of an impending pogrom circulated among 
the Jewish community during Orthodox Holy Week in April. Yet 
unlike the past, when Jews did not take precautions, in 1905 they 
mobilized. 
Building upon the self-defense groups they had formed in the 
aftermath of the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, Odessa's Jews armed 
themselves and issued appeals, calling upon the non-Jewish residents 
of Odessa to show restraint and not engage in violence against Jews. 
Just before Easter the National Committee of Jewish Self-Defense 
ROBERT WEINBERG 
distributed a series of leaflets threa tening non-Jews with armed 
retaliation in th even t of a pogrom. Th committee urged aJI J w 
to JOln lf-d fl nse brigad · and prepare to counter an y atta k n 
Jews and bcir property. M n wer told to arm them Iv s with 
guns, knives, clubs, and whips, and women were encouraged to 
prepare solutions of sulfuric acid. Bundists, Bolsheviks, and Men-
sheviks joined in these efforts by also reorganizing self-defense 
brigades established the year before and taking up collections for 
weapons and ammunition. Despite the circulation of pogromist 
literature inciting Russians to attack Jews, local officials and a 
Bundist correspondent concluded that ru mors of a pogrom were 
unfounded. In fact, the Bund's corr sp nd nt wrote that "a 
pogrcmist mood was ... unnoticeable." 20 
Yet fear of an impending pogrom resurfaced in June in the 
aftermath of a general strike and disorders occasioned by the arrival 
of the battleship Potemkin. On r 3 June Cossacks shot several workers 
from metalworking and machine-construction factories who had 
b "n on ·trike ·in Lh beginning f May. \1 orkers r t liated on r4 
June by ·ngaging in ma si e work loppa es and attacking th 
po lie · \ i th guns and ro ks but the arrival of the Potemkin tha t night 
div"rtt:d the worker from furth r c nfrontation with th ir mploy t 
an th· gov mm nl. n 15 Jun in ·t ad of intensifying the ·trik, 
thousand· of d ssan jammed Lh port di.strict in ord r to view the 
battleship and rally behind the mutinous sailors. By late afternoon 
some m~embers of the crowd began to ransack warehouses and set fire 
to the harbor's wooden buildings. Although available sources do not 
allow a precise determination of the composition of the rioters, 
partial arre· t re ords r veal that non-Jewi. h vagrants (Liudi be;;, 
opredelcmiyk!t zaniatii) dockworkers, and olher day lab r 1 comprised 
the majority. To uppr the unrest, th miUtary ·ordon d off the 
harbor and opened fire on the trapp d crowd. By the next morning 
well over r ,ooo people had died, victims of either the soldiers' bullets 
or the fire which consumed the harbor. 21 
During the. disorders rumors of an impending pogrom once 
again surfa d , as right-wing agitators attempted to incite Russian 
workers against the Jews. 22 On 20 June, only a few days after the 
massacre, a virulently antisemitic, four-page broadside entitled 
Od sskie dni app ar d . h tracl blam. d the Jews, in particular th 
a tional Committ of J ewi h lf-Defi n and seconda ry school 
·tuclcn t.s , r. r ti r ent disord r a nd the tragedy at th port. 
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Accusing the Jews of fomenting the unrest and enlisting the support 
of unwitting Russians, the author of the broadside stated that Jews 
initiated the shootings on 14 and r 5 June and were responsible for 
setting fire to the port. The tract ended with a call to hold the Jewish 
community of Odessa collectively responsible for the destruction and 
demanded that Jews compensate Gentiles who suffered p'roperty 
damage and personal loss. In addition, Odesskie dni called for the 
disarming of all Jews and suggested a general search of all Jewish 
apartments in the city. Failure to carry out these proposals, the trnct 
concluded, would make it "impossible for Christians to live in 
Odessa" and result in the take-over of Odessa by Jews. 23 
While Odesskie dni did not call for acts of anti-Jewish violence, its 
appearance underscores the tense atmosphere existing in Odessa and 
highlights how in times of social unrest and political crisis ethnic 
hostility could come to the fore and threaten further disruption of 
social calm. In the week or so following the massive disorders of mid-
June, scattered attacks against Jews were reported as antisemitic 
agitators tried to stir up Gentiles into a pogromist mood. 24 Moreover, 
the belief that Jews were responsible for the June unrest was evident 
in the report-s of some government officials. Gendarme chiefKuzubov 
wrote that the instigators of the disorders and arson were 
"exclusively Jews" and Count Aleksei lgnatiev, in his report on the 
disorders in Kherson and Ekaterinoslav provinces, also accused Jews 
of setting fire to the port but did not furnish any hard evidence or 
substantiation. 25 Though no pogrom occurred in June, the senti-
ments expressed in both Odesskie dni and official reports indicate the 
emotionally charged atmosphere of Russian-Jewish relations in 
Odessa and the extent to which government officials, who in their 
search for simple explanations and unwillingness to dig deeper into 
the root causes of the social and political turmoil engulfing Odessa, 
were prepared to affix blame to the Jews. 
Jews found it difficult to dispel the accusations expressed in 
Odesskie dni. While many reports of Jewish revolutionary activity 
were exaggerations or even fabrications, Jews were behind some -
I though certainly not all - of the unrest in Odessa. During the summer the police arrested several Jews for making and stockpiling 
bombs. Jews also figured prominently among the 133 Social 
Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries either considered pol-
itically unreliable, arrested or exiled after the June Days. In 
addition, a leaflet distributed throughout the city, apparently by a 
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Plate 8. Group portrait of the Odessa Bund self-defense group, posing with 
victims of the 1905 pogrom at the cemetery. The banner, in Yiddish and 
Russian, reads: "Glory to those who have fallen in the struggle for freedom!" 
Plate 9. Members of the Odessa Bund killed in the pogrom of 1905 
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Bundist organization, urged Jews to arm themselves, struggle for 
civil and political freedom, and overthrow the autocracy. 26 Jews also 
helped organize rallies at the university and direct student strikes 
and public demonstrations. Like others throughout the Empire, 
Odessa's university became the locus of anti-government activity 
after August when the Tsar granted administrative autonomy to 
Russia's universities, thereby removing these institutions from the 
jurisdiction of the police. Jewish youths, students, and workers filled 
the ranks of the crowds that attended the rallies at the university in 
September and October, and Jews actively participated in the wave 
of work stoppages, demonstrations, and street disorders that broke 
out in mid-October. On 16 October, a day of major disturbances, 
197 of the 214 persons arrested wereJews. 27 Moreover, Jews eagerly 
celebrated the political concessions granted in the October Mani-
festo, seeing them as the first step in the civil and political 
emancipation of Russian Jewry. 
These events confirmed many high-ranking police and other 
officials in the beliefthatJews were a seditious element. As we have 
seen, many government officials blamed Jews for the June unrest. In 
doing so they were following a tradition of accusing Jews for 
fomenting trouble in Odessa. At the turn of the century, for example, 
the city governor even asked the Ministry of the Interior to limit 
Jewish migration to Odessa in the hope that such a measure would 
weaken the revolutionary movement. 28 Such attitudes, along with 
the legacy of discrimination against Russian Jewry and govern-
mental tolerance and at times sponsorship of anti-Jewish organi-
zations and propaganda, signaled to antisemites that authorities in 
Odessa would probably countenance violence againstJews. 29 When 
combined with economic resentments and frustrations as well as 
timeworn religious prejudices, the perception that Jews were 
revolutionaries provided fertile ground for a pogrom. To those 
residents of Odessa alarmed by the opposition to the Tsar and 
government, Jews were a convenient target for retaliation. 
Politics in Odessa polarized during 1905 as anti and pro-
government forces coalesced and mobilized. Militant right-wing 
organizations like the Black Hundreds and patriotic student groups 
consolidated their ranks, and radical student groups emerged as 
significant political forces, joining the organized revolutionary 
parties already active in Odessa. Indeed, the stage was set for 
confrontation between the forces of revolution and reaction and the 
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pogrom occurred in the context of this unrest and Odessa's feverish 
atmosphere. During the week before the October pogrom, public 
calm was disturbed by bloody confrontations pitting the populace 
against soldiers and police. The crucial question is why this unrest 
degenerated into one of the worst anti-Jewish progroms ever 
experienced in imperial Russia. 
On r 5 October, a day after the police injured several high school 
students who were boycotting classes in sympathy with striking 
railway workers, radical students and revolutionaries appealed to 
workers to start a general strike. They collected donations for guns 
and ammunition and representatives of the city's three Social 
Democratic organizations visited factories and workshops. Reports 
also circulated that students and revolutionaries were forming 
armed militias. On r6 October students, youths, and workers 
roamed the streets of Odessa, building barricades and engaging the 
police and military in pitched battles. The troops summoned to 
suppress the demonstrations encountered fierce resistance, as 
demonstrators behind the barricades greeted them with rocks and 
gunfire. Military patrols were also targets of snipers. The troops 
retaliated by opening fire , and by early evening the army had 
secured the streets of Odessa. The police disarmed and arrested 
scores of demonstrators, systematically bludgeoning some into 
unconsciousness. 30 
The 17th of October passed without any public disturbances or 
confrontations, but life did not return to normal. The military 
continued to patrol the city, schools and many stores remained 
closed and, even though not all workers responded to the appeal for 
a general strike, at least 4,000 workers - many of whom were Jewish 
- walked off their jobs either voluntarily or after receiving threats 
from other workers already on strike. Groups of workers congregated 
outside stores that opened for business, singing songs and drinking 
vodka. At the university, professors and students, along with 
representatives of revolutionary parties, redoubled efforts to form 
armed militias. 31 
The storm broke on r8 October. News of the October Manifesto 
had reached Odessa officials the previous evening and by the next 
morning thousands of people thronged the streets to celebrate. As 
one university student exclaimed, "a joyous crowd appeared in the 
streets - people greeted each other as if it were a holiday." 32 Jews, 
hoping that the concessions would lead to the end of all legal 
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disabilities against them, were joined by non-Jews in vigorously and 
enthusiastically celebrating the granting of civil and political 
liberties. 
At first the crowds were peaceful, but the quiet did not last long. 
Soon after the demonstrations began, several individuals began to 
unfurl red flags and banners with anti-government slogans. Others 
shouted slogans like "Down with the Autocracy," "Long Live 
Freedom" and "Down with the Police." Apartment dwellers 
draped red carpets and shawls from their balconies and windows, 
while groups of arrogant demonstrators forced passersby to doff their 
hats or bow before the flags. In the city council building, 
demonstrators ripped down the portrait of the Tsar, substituted a 
red flag for the imperial colors and collected money for weapons. 
The city governor also reported that one group of demonstrators tied 
portraits of Nicholas II to the tails of dogs and then released them 
to run through the city. 33 The mood of the demonstrators grew more 
violent as the day wore on. Groups of celebrants - primarily Jewish 
youths according to official accounts - viciously attacked and 
disarmed policemen. By mid-afternoon the office of the civil governor 
had received reports that two policemen had been killed, ten 
wounded and twenty-two disarmed, and that many others had 
abandoned their posts in order to avoid possible injury. 34 
The clashes were not limited to attacks on policemen by angry 
demonstrators. Toward the end of the day tensions between those 
Odessans who heralded the Manifesto and those who disapproved of 
the concessions granted by Nicholas had reached a breaking point. 
Angered over being forced to doff their caps and outraged by the 
sight of desecrated portraits of the Tsar, supporters of the monarchy 
gave vent to their anger and frustration. They demonstrated their 
hostility not by attacking other Russians celebrating in the streets, 
but by turning on Jews, for they viewed them as the source of 
Russia's current problems. Clashes occurred throughout the day as 
groups of armed demonstrators, chiefly Jewish students and workers, 
scuffled with bands of Russians. These outbreaks of violence marked 
the beginning of the infamous pogrom and were the culmination of 
trends that had been unfolding in the city for several weeks. 
Armed confrontations between Jews and Russians originated near 
the Jewish district ofMoldavanka in the afternoon and early evening 
of r8 October. The clashes apparently started when a group of Jews 
carrying red flags to celebrate the October Manifesto attempted to 
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on ince a group of Ru sian work rs l() doff th ir ap Lo the fl, ·s. 
Har h word were x hanged, as uffle n u d and lhen h t rang 
out. Bol.h gr ups s att red, bu l qui kl y r s mbl d in nearby tr ets 
and r umed fighting. Th lashe oon turned into an anti-.J wi ·h 
J"iot, a Ru sian indiscriminately atta k d .J w and b gan l 
vandal.izc and lo t Jewi h homes apartm nl and stor · in th 
neighborho cl. Th riot r aJ lurncd n p li m n and troops 
ummoned lo quell the di ord r a tions suggesting that pogr mi ts 
wer not yet fuUy focused on J w in th ir atta k . Th miiilary n 
ctob r 18 was equa lly igilant in it fforts t r ·train both Ru ·sian 
and Jewish rioters, vigorously suppressing these disturbances and 
restoring order by early evening. Four Russians were killed, dozens 
of Russians wounded - including policemen - and twelve Russians 
arrested as a result of the unrest. The number of Jews who were 
injured or arrested is unknown. 35 
he pogrom b gan in full for e lh n xl day, 19 0 tob r. In lh 
mid-morning hundreds of Russians - childr n worn n and m n -
rath red in various parts of lh 'ty for patrioli mar h to di play 
their loyalty to th Tsar. Day labor r , pe ially th mploy cl al 
the do ks, ompris d a maj rel m nt of th rov d that a s mbl cl 
at the harbor and were joined by Russian factory and construction 
w rk rs, shopkeepers, salesclerks, workshop employees, other day 
laborers and vagrants. 36 
h e patrioti p roc ssions had the earmarks of a rally organiz d 
by cxtr m , ri hl-wing political organization · lik th Bia k 
Hundr ds. The main contingent of mar h r assembled al ustom 
quar at the harbor, wh r th proces ion organiz r di tributed 
flags, icon and portraits ol th T ar. Th mar h rs passed around 
bottle · or vodka, and plainclotb s policem n rep rt dly handed out 
n t onJy vodka but al o mon y and gun .37 nlo k 1 and pa . r by 
joined the proc i n a th demon trator mad · lh ir way from the 
p rt to th ity enter. in 'in th nation.al anth m and r ligiou 
hymn and a corclin · to om reports, shouting "D wn with th 
J ew ' and 'It's necessary to beat th m " lhey lopp d at th ity 
ounci l buildfog and substituted th imp rial col r for lh red flag 
thal demonstrator had rai ·d th previ us day. They then h aded 
t \ ard th alh dral lo at din central Ode sa stopping en route at 
the r -sid n s of Neidhardt and Baron Al ksanclr Kaulbars 
ommander of th Od ssa Military Distri t. Kaulbar-, fi aring 
onfron talion belw n th patrioti mar h r and left-wing students 
and r volutionaric a ked them to disperse. om h dee! hi 
--
The pogrom of 1905 in Odessa 
request, but most members of the procession continued their march. 
Neidhardt, on the other hand, greeted the patriots enthusiastically 
and urged them to hold their memorial service at the cathedral. 
After a brief prayer service, the procession continued to march 
through the streets of central Odessa. 38 
Suddenly, shots rang out and a young boy carrying an icon lay 
dead. Most accounts of the incident assert that the shots came from 
surrounding buildings, probably from the offices of luzhnoe obo;::,renie. 
No one knows for certain who fired first, but evidence strongly 
suggests that revolutionaries or members of Jewish and student self-
defense brigades were responsible. 39 In any case, the crowd panicked 
and ran through the streets as more shots were fired from rooftops, 
balconies, and apartment windows, prompting some to plead for 
police protection. Revolutionaries and self-defense units organized 
by students and Jews threw homemade bombs at the Russian 
demonstrators. These actions suggest that they, along with pro-
government forces, were itchy for confrontation and ready to 
instigate trouble. The shootings 'triggered a chain reaction: 
convinced that Jews were responsible for the shootings, members of 
the patriotic demonstration began to shout "Beat the Yids" and 
"Death to the Yids" and went on a rampage, attacking Jews and 
destroying Jewish apartments, homes, and stores. 
The course of events was similar in other parts of the city, as 
members of student and Jewish self-defense units fired on other 
Russians holding patriotic services and provoked similar pogromist 
responses. However, in Peresyp, a heavily Russian working-class 
district where no patriotic procession took place, the pogrom started 
only after pogromists from the city center arrived and began to incite 
local residents. By mid-afternoon a full-fledged pogrom had 
developed and it raged until 22 October. 40 
The lurid details of the pogrom can be found in several eyewitness 
and secondary accounts. Although the list of atrocities perpetrated 
against the Jews is too long to recount here, suffice it to say that 
pogromists brutally and indiscriminately beat, mutilated, and 
murdered defenseless Jewish men, women, and children. They 
hurled Jews out of windows, raped and cut open the stomachs of 
pregnant women, and slaughtered infants in front of their parents. 
In one particularly gruesome incident, pogromists hung a woman 
upside down by her legs and arranged the bodies of her six dead 
children on the floor below. 41 
The pogrom's unrestrained violent and destructive excesses were 
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in large m asur mad · pos ible by the failure of authorities to adopt 
any count rm a ures. Low-ranking policemen and soldiers failed to 
interfer with the pogromi ·t and in many instan s parti ·pated in 
the lo ting and killing. At times, poli men, e king L av nge the 
attacks of r6 and 18 ctober on th ir oil a u , ' ent far as to 
prote tion for pogromists b firing on th lf-defl ns uni ts 
by J w , tud 1Jts and revolu tionaries. For th ir part, 
soldi r concluding from the a tion of th polic that the pogr m 
was san tioncd by high r au horiti , stood idJ b)' whit · po romists 
looted stor and murd red unarm d J ws. S me policeme 
di barged their weapons into th air and told rioters that th . hots 
had come from apartments inhabited by Jews, leaving the latter 
vulnerable to vicious beatings and murder. yewitnesses also 
reported seeing policemen directing pogromists to Jewish-owned 
tor or Jew apartment whil te r.i 1 the rioters away from the 
prop rty of non-J ws. As the correspondent fi r Collier' reported 
"Ikon and crosses w re pla d in ' indows and hung outsid doors 
to mark the re idences of the Ru sian and in a lmost very ca e this 
wa a sufficient protection. Indeed, Otlesskii pogrom i samoobm·o11a , 
an emotional a count of the ctober trag dy publi h d by Lab · 
Zionists in Paris, argues that th p Ii e more than any ther group 
in Od ssa were respon ibl for th deaLh and pillage.'12 
Th viden e indi ate Lhat p lie m n act d (or failed to act) witb 
th knowledge aod tacit approval of their sup rior . ith · 
Neidhardt nor Kaulbar took any deci iv action to suppr . s th · 
pogrom when disorders erupted. In fa ' t, the h ad of Lh dessa 
gendarmes admitt d that the military d id not apply sufficient en rgy 
to end th pogrom and stated that pogromist gr eted ldicr and 
policemen with shouts of "Hurrah" and then nt.inued th .ir 
rampage and pillage without interference. 43 It was not until 21 
October that Kaulbars publicly announced that his troops were 
under orders to shoot at pogromists as well as self-defensists. Until 
then soldiers and police had shot only at self-defensists. Whether the 
2 1 0 tobcr dir ctive ord ring troop to sho t at pogromi ts help d 
to restore order i uncl ar. While it is diffi ult to di ount ntireJy the 
eftect of the directive particularly since the pogrom peter d oul the 
next day, it bears noting that the return to alm may hav be'n du 
more to the exhau tion of th pogromist mob than to any mili ary 
dir ctiv and action. Y t il is a lso important to 'tr · that .vhen the 
military did act to stop public disorders, as they did on 18 October 
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and again on 21 and 22 October, pogromists generally did desist and 
disperse. Considering that the pogrom ended on 22 October, one 
cannot help but conclude that more immediate and effective action 
by the military could have prevented the pogrom from assuming 
such monstrous dimensions. 
Kaulbars, defending his inaction before a delegation of city 
councillors on 22 October, stated that he could not take more 
decisive measures since Neidhardt had not made a formal de-
termination that armed force be used to stem the disorders. Relevant 
regulations permitted civil authorities to request the assistance of 
military units when the police concluded that they were unable to 
maintain control; the prerogative to determine whether force should 
be employed resided with the city governor, but once he made such 
a decision, then the military commander assumed independent 
control until the end of operations. 44 Thus, Kaul bars believed that 
he lacked authorization to deploy his troops against the pogroms 
since Neidhardt had not followed procedure, a conclusion also 
reached by Senator Aleksandr Kuzminskii, head of the official 
government inquiry into the pogrom. 
Kaulbars discounted reports that his troops were participating in 
the disorders, terming them unfounded and unsubstantiated rumors. 
He issued his directive only after Neidhardt visited him on 20 
October and reiterated a request made on I g October to adopt 
measures to prevent the outbreak of a pogrom. More importantly, 
the fact that the 2 1 October order was signed by chief-of-staff 
Lieutenant-General Bezradetskii and only issued by Kaulbars's 
office strongly suggests that the military commander was compelled 
by his superiors to suppress the pogrom. Neidhardt and Kaulbars 
defended their individual actions (or inactions) and bitterly accused 
each other of dereliction of duty, claiming the other was responsible 
for maintaining order. The sad truth of the matter is that police and 
troops were in a position to act but failed to due to the absence of 
instructions, rendering irrelevant the claims of Neidhardt and 
Kaulbars that the other possessed authority to suppress the 
pogrom. 45 Consequently, pogromists enjoyed almost two full days of 
unrestrained destruction. 
Senator Kuzminskii castigated the city governor for withdrawing 
all police from their posts in the early afternoon on I 8 October, an 
action he believed to warrant criminal investigation. The reasons for 
Neidhardt's action are unclear, since his reports are contradictory 
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and conflict with accounts of other informed police officials and 
civilian leaders. Neidhardt claimed that he was seeking to protect 
the lives of policemen who were subject to attack by celebrants of the 
Manifesto, but close examination of the testimony indicates that the 
bulk of attacks on policemen occurred after they were removed from 
their posts. Indeed, many had abandoned their posts before trouble 
erupted. Nonetheless, the possibility remains that the city governor 
was acting to protect his men, since several of them had been 
victimized prior to his directive. Having removed policemen from 
their posts, Neidhardt instructed them to patrol the city in groups. 
Strong evidence also suggests that Neidhardt tacitly approved the 
student militias and hoped they could maintain order in Odessa in 
the absence of the police. 46 Kuzminskii concluded that Neidhardt 
was guilty of dereliction of duty because he had left Odessa 
defenseless by not ordering the police patrols to take vigorous action 
to prevent trouble and suppress the disorders.47 The absence of 
police ready to maintain law and order on r8 and rg October made 
for an explosive situation, signifying the surrender of the city to 
armed bands of pogromists and self-defensists. 
Both Neidhardt and Kaulbars defended the behavior of the police 
and military. Referring to the intensity of the shooting and bombing, 
the city governor and military commander argued that attacks by 
student and Jewish militias hampered efforts of policemen and 
soldiers to contain the pogrom. They also accused self-defense 
brigades of shooting not only at pogromists, but also at police, 
soldiers, and Cossacks. The police and military, according to 
Neidhardt and Kaulbars, had to contend first with the self-defense 
groups before turning their attention to the pogromists. 48 Konstantin 
Prisnenko, commander of an infantry brigade, supported Neidhardt 
and Kaulbars when he told Kuzminskii that "it was hard to stop 
pogromshchiki because the soldiers were diverted by revolutionaries 
who were shooting at them." 49 
The police and military undoubtedly were targets of civilian 
militias and were rightly concerned about their safety and security. 
Yet as the pogrom gathered momentum, one can hardly blame 
members of self-defense brigades for shooting at soldiers and 
policemen, for many of them were actively participating in the 
violence. Moreover, Neidhardt and Kaulbars acted as though 
civilian militias were the only groups involved in the violence, 
conveniently ignoring how the actions of policemen and soldiers 
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after the pogrom began were provocative and might compel Jews to 
defend themselves. Despite Neidhardt's 19 October request to 
Kaulbars to help forestall disorders, it was not until the pogrom was 
in full swing that any official made an effort to stop it. Neither 
Neidhardt nor Kaulbars gave immediate orders to their staffs to 
subdue pogromists and restore order. Had the police and military 
genuinely applied their energies to halting the pogrom, the need for 
self-defense would have been reduced and attacks on soldiers and 
policemen would have dropped accordingly. The explanations 
offered by Neidhardt and Kaulbars were self-serving attempts to 
shift the blame for the failure of the police and military to perform 
their basic law enforcement functions to the victims of the pogrom. 
How then are we to explain the outbreak of the pogrom? Was any 
one individual or group responsible for conceiving and directing the 
pogrom or was the orgy of violence against Jews spontaneous in 
origin and execution? Like many government officials, Kuzminskii 
concluded that the Odessa pogrom was a spontaneous display of 
outrage against the Jews whose political activity had elicited the 
pogromist response. Despite his criticism of Neidhardt, Kuzminskii 
joined the city governor, Kaulbars, and other authorities in Odessa 
in blaming the pogrom on its victims, since the Jews played a visible 
role in the revolutionary movement and events of 1905. Such 
tortuous reasoning dated back to the 1880s when government 
apologists seeking to explain the pogroms of 1881 argued that Jews, 
not pogromists, bore responsibility for anti-Jewish violence. 50 Unlike 
previous pogroms, which Kuzminskii attributed to national hatred 
and economic exploitation, the October disorders occurred as a 
result of the scandalous public behavior of Odessa's Jews, especially 
after the announcement of the October Manifesto. Okhrana chief 
Bobrov, for example, concluded that Jews were responsible for 
provoking pogromist attacks because they were spearheading a 
revolutionary attack on the autocracy in an effort to establish their 
"own tsardom." For government officials, then, patriotic Russians 
were justified in seeking punishment of Jews for such treasonous 
behavior as desecrating portraits of the Tsar and forcing bystanders 
to pay tribute to revolutionary flags. They could also point to the 
stockpiling of weapons and medical supplies at the university and the 
organization of student militias in the days immediately before the 
issuance of the October Manifesto as evidence of a revolutionary 
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conspiracy to overthrow the government. Fears that Jews were 
prepared to use the concessions of the manifesto as a springboard for 
the subjugation of non-Jews created a situation fraught with 
frightening prospects. Kuzminskii defined the pogrom as an offshoot 
of the patriotic procession and blamed its excesses on the failure of 
Neidhardt to adopt adequate countermeasures. 51 
The legacy of discrimination against Russian Jewry and govern-
mental tolerance and at times sponsorship of anti-Jewish organi-
zations and propaganda provided fertile ground for a pogrom. 52 
When combined with economic resentments and frustrations, 
timeworn religious prejudices and the political polarization of 
Odessa society during 1905, the beliefthatJews were revolutionaries 
and fears that they were prepared to use the concessions of the 
manifesto as a springboard for the subjugation of non-Jews helped to 
create a situation fraught with frightening prospects. To those 
residents of Odessa alarmed by the opposition to the Tsar and 
government, Jews were a convenient and obvious target for 
retaliation. 
It is questionable, however, whether the pogrom was purely 
spontaneous. Even though the work of Hans Rogger and Heinz-
Dietrich Lowe has done much to absolve many high-ranking 
government ministers and officials in St. Petersburg of engineering 
the pogroms and giving a signal to mark their start, the culpability 
of certain local officials is less easy to dismiss. 53 The staPdard view of 
the Odessa pogrom places much of the blame on the encouragement 
and connivance of local officials, though not all the sources agree on 
whether the police and military actually planned the pogrom. Many 
contemporaries blamed civilian and military authorities, especially 
Neidhardt, for fostering a pogromist atmosphere and not taking 
measures to suppress the pogrom. Members of the city council and 
the newspaper Odesskie novosti, for example, placed full responsibility 
for the bloodletting on Neidhardt by stressing that his decision to 
remove the police from their posts gave free reign to pogromists. and 
Khronika evreiskoi z:.hiz:.ni called for a judicial investigation in order to 
reveal the city governor's "criminal responsibility. " 54 
Kuzminskii himself collected evidence that points to the in-
volvement of low-ranking members of the police force in the 
planning and organization of the patriotic counter-demonstration 
and pogrom. He stopped short, however, of suggesting that either 
Neidhardt or other local civil and police officials planned the 
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pogrom. 55 According to the testimony of L. D. Teplitskii, an ensign 
in the army, as early as 15 and r6 October policemen were proposing 
to use force against Jews as punishment for their role in instigating 
the current wave of strikes and disorders in Odessa. As one 
policeman told Teplitskii, "Jews want freedom - well, we'll kill two 
or three thousand. Then they'll know what freedom is." Teplitskii 
also testified to meeting a group of day laborers on the morning of 
r 8 October who told him they had just received instructions at a 
police station to attack Jews that evening. 56 In working-class 
neighborhoods policemen and pogromist agitators went from door to 
door, spreading rumors thatJews were slaughtering Russian families 
and urging Russian residents to repel the Jews with force. Policemen 
reportedly compiled lists of Jewish-owned stores and Jews' apart-
ments to facilitate attacks, and one Jewish newspaper reported that 
documents existed revealing how plainclothes policemen paid 
pogromists from 80 kopecks to 3 roubles per day upon instructions 
of their superiors. 57 Other evidence even suggests that policemen 
were instructed not to interfere with pogromists. An army captain 
informed Kuzminskii that a policeman had told him that his 
superiors had given their permission for three days of violence 
because Jews had destroyed the Tsar's portrait in the city council. 58 
Unfortunately, no evidence has surfaced indicating which police 
officials were responsible for these directives. Nor is there conclusive 
evidence linking Neidhardt to the planning and approval of the 
pogrom or even pogrom agitation. Considering Neidhardt's efforts 
prior to October to avert unrest and disorders through patient 
negotiation and timely compromise with workers and employers, it 
would have been out of character for him to have approved, let alone 
planned, a major public disturbance. We have already seen how he 
behaved when rumors of a pogrom circulated earlier in the spring. 
Like most government officials entrusted with the responsibility of 
maintaining law and order, Neidhardt possessed a strong disci-
plinarian streak and would have been hesitant to sanction any kind 
of public unrest for fear of events getting out of hand. 59 To be sure, 
Neidhardt knew about the patriotic procession and even welcomed 
it, but this does not warrant the conclusion drawn by many Odessa 
residents that the city governor had advance knowledge of the 
pogrom. In fact, Neidhardt so feared an emption of violence on r g 
October that he requested Kaulbars to withdraw permission for a 
funeral procession planned for that day to commemorate the 
ROBERT WEINBERG 
students killed on r6 October in order to avoid confrontation 
between funeral marchers and the patriotic counter--demonstration. 
He also called upon the military commander to adopt measures to 
prevent the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence. 60 The quickness with 
which the authorities cooperated on October r6 to suppress street 
disorders clearly suggests that Neidhardt and Kaul bars were 
genuinely trying to prevent a serious breach of social peace. 
Yet questions remain. Why were the police and military derelict 
in their duty once the pogrom began? What accounts for Kaulbars's 
failure to order his troops, who were in position, to restore order? 
Why did Neidhardt not prevent individual policemen from 
participating in the looting and pillaging and wait until 2 r October 
before ordering his staff back to work? And how can we explain his 
failure to request vigorous action by the military as well as his callous 
refusal to heed the pleas of pogrom victims, including a rabbi and 
bank director, who begged him to intercede ?61 The truth of the 
matter may simply have been that Neidhardt had few options. 
Individual policemen were already abandoning their posts even 
before he issued his directive of r 8 October and civilian attacks had 
begun. Furthermore, the police refused to return to their posts on 2 r 
October, despite the city governor's order to do so. Neidhardt may 
have realized that he could not depend on a severely underpaid, 
understaffed, and disgruntled police force to maintain order in the 
city. The Odessa police, like most municipal police forces throughout 
the Empire, not only had a long-standing reputation for corruption 
but, unlike many others, often failed to obey orders and directives. 
Neidhardt was aware of the low morale among his police force, 
attributing it to low wages and inadequate training. 62 The city 
governor may also have realized that he could no longer control the 
actions of most members of the police force and turned to Kaul bars 
for help only after the pogrom had reached such dimensions that it 
became clear that student self-defense brigades were an ineffective 
check on the violence and destruction. Another possible scenario is 
that he may simply have reasoned that the police and military were 
powerless to control the pogromist mobs in light of their failure to 
contain popular unrest earlier that week. 
His sense of helplessness notwithstanding, Neidhart's behavior 
certainly was not blameless, and there is no doubt that his sympathies 
lay with the pogromists. He was a virulent antisemite who, in the 
midst of the pogrom, reportedly told a delegation of Jewish leaders, 
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"You wanted freedom. Well, now you're getting 'Jewish free-
dom '." 63 From Neidhardt's perspective, Jews were responsible for 
the disorders and the pogrom was retribution. Thus, although 
Neidhardt did not plan the pogrom or even, it would seem, possess 
prior knowledge of it, he generally sympathized with the actions of 
pogromists and may have viewed attacks on Jews, once he realized 
that he was unable to prevent them, as an effective method of 
squelching the revolution. Neidhardt's actions, then, support in a 
very limited and modified way the notion that officials hoped 
pogroms would deflect popular resentment from the government. 
However, in the case of the Odessa pogrom, the anti-Jewish violence 
was not the result of plotting by high-ranking local authorities: the 
willingness of Neidhardt as well as Kaul bars to tolerate the pogrom 
and delay ordering their men into action evidently occurred after the 
violence erupted but nonetheless underscores their culpability and 
negligence. 
Kaulbars also shares the burden of responsibility for not acting 
more promptly to restore order. The military commander, who was 
curiously not censured by Kuzminskii, was derelict in the per-
formance of his duty since his troops were already in position to act 
against pogromists. Despite confusion over whether he or Neidhardt 
possessed jurisdiction to issue orders to stem the disorders, Kaul bars 
certainly had the authority to order his men to subdue the 
pogromists, especially since Neidhardt had requested on the rgth 
that he take measures to prevent a pogrom. Thus, Kaulbars's 
defense that he could not interfere in "civilian administration" since 
Neidhardt had not explicitly determined that armed force was 
needed to restore order is a feeble excuse for his lack of action and 
direction, as was the mud-slinging, so evident in Kuzminskii's final 
report, between Kaulbars and Neidhardt over who possessed 
authority to suppress the pogromists. 
Kaulbars not only ignored reports that his troops were partici-
pating in the pogrom and waited several days before ordering them 
to combat pogromists, but he even remarked to an assembly of 
Odessa policemen on 2 r October that "all of us sympathize in our 
souls with the pogrom." Yet Kaulbars, who somewhat later openly 
patronized and even supplied arms to the right-wing Union of 
Russian People, tempered his remarks by acknowledging that 
neither his personal sympathies nor those of policemen and soldiers 
relieved them of the responsibility to maintain law and order. 64 This 
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conflict between personal val·ues and offici .::. l duty, betwc•.'X• sympathy 
for the pogromists and obliga.tion to preserve :wcia.l pea[:c, helps tQ 
account for the failure of Kaulbars and Neidhard t to act more 
decisively. Undoubtedly tlH'Y were galled at the prospect of ordering 
their men to interfere with tbe pogromists, who, in their eyes, were. 
the only loyal subjects of a!: :ocracy in Odessa. How can one jll3tify 
shooting defenders of the T~ar and the autocratic order? Such logic 
and attitudes led both men t;' be derelict in their duties to preserv-;~ 
law and order and suppre':' the pogromist mobs. 
Kuzminskii was essentiall~ correct to explain the timing of the 
pogrom in terms of the pc:i1ical crisis facing the regime in O ctober 
1905. But politics alone ,fo not explain the motives of many 
pogromists. Aside from th•.': pr;lice, who were the other participa.E ~" 
in the pogrom and why did they join the police in viciously attacking 
Jews? While not discoun' ing the impact of political events jn 
triggering the pogrom, certain social and economic characte1·istics Gf 
life in Odessa also must be c:rnsidered in a complete account of the 
pogrom. 
Available sources do r:. ·1 t ailow a precise determination of the 
composition of the pogrnmi~t crowds, but they do reveal that 
unskilled, non-Jewish da)' laborers, more than any oth (;r group 
(including the police), fill {':d the ranks of the mobs which attacked 
Jews and destroyed property. Since these workers 'Nere especially 
prone to anti-Jewish violeiKe and, as we have already seen, playc::.1 
a significant role not only in the patriotic procession but in other 
popular disorders earlier in the year as well, a closer exa rninatirm of 
their lives might provide insight into their rnotives. 
Day laborers in Odes8a led a precarious social and economic 
existence, suffering from irregular impermanent -work and. lo11v 
wages. Many were unmarried male migrants to Odessa who lacked 
marketable skills and work experience. Large numbers of thes<'. day 
laborers came from the countryside, where rural poverty and 
overpopulation were driving rnany young peasants to the cities in 
search of work. Other day workers were Jews who moved to Odes:;a 
in order to escape the des~i tntion of life in th e shtetlekh and sn10Jl 
towns of the Pale of Settlement. 
Competition for employrr.rnt between J ewish ar:: d gentile day 
laborers assumed special io :vJ; ta.nce at docksicl es and in the railw2.y 
depots, where thousands of unskilled workers vied for employment 
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during the peak season of commercial activity, which began in 
spring and lasted well into the autumn. According to the 1897 
census, slightly over 16,ooo workers were unskilled day laborers 
without permanent jobs and specific occupations, but who supple-
mented the city's sizable work force of dockworkers, porters, and 
carters during the busy season. Precise data do not exist, but most 
estimates of the number of dockworkers in Odessa at the turn of the 
century range from 4,000 to 7 ,ooo, with one estimate placing the 
number of dockworkers at 20,000. Approximately half these workers 
were Jews and close to w,ooo other Jews found employment as 
unskilled laborers elsewhere in the city by century's end. 65 
Even during peak periods of port activity, operators of shipping 
lines, brokerage firms, and warehouses did not require the services of 
all dockworkers looking for work. In the summer few dockworkers 
worked more than fifteen days a month; job competition acquired 
even larger dimensions during the off-season or periods of slump and 
recession, when over half of all dockworkers were unemployed. It is 
estimated that between 1900 and 1903 at least 2,000 dockworkers 
were unemployed at any given time66 • More specifically, unem-
ployment for longshoremen increased dramatically in the late 
18gos and early 1 goos when the labor market began to constrict as 
a result of crop failures, economic recession, the Russo-Japanese 
War, and Odessa's declining share of the export trade in grain. The 
last factor was due in part to the failure of Odessa to keep pace with 
the more modern and better-equipped harbors of other port cities in 
southern Russia. The use of conveyor belts at docksides, first 
introduced on a limited basis in the 1870s to facilitate port 
operations, reduced employment opportunities for stevedores and 
exerted downward pressures on wages by the century's end. The 
constricting labor market heightened job competition between 
Jewish and Gentile dockworkers, culminating in 1906 and 1907 with 
shipowners, city authorities, and longshoremen setting up a hiring 
system that established quotas for the number of Jewish and non-
J ewish dockworkers. Evidence exists indicating that tensions among 
dockworkers of different nationalities - primarily between Russians 
and Jews, but to a lesser extent also a mong Russians, Georgians, and 
Turks - influenced the d cision to establish this quota system. 67 
Some day workers belonged to work gangs or artels which were 
either hired by subcontractors on a regular basis or employed 
directly by the shipping lines. Each company generally used the 
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services of different work gangs, whose members were hired by the 
month or day. Yet the vast majority of day laborers lacked 
permanent work, a situation that the hiring process made even more 
difficult. In order to work on a given day, day laborers not belonging 
to work gangs placed their names on sign-up sheets that sub-
contractors for shipping lines and import-export firms posted at 
different taverns throughout the city. The prospects of finding work 
in this manner were slim, however. Prospective laborers had to 
arrive between 2 and 3 am in order to ensure themselves a place on 
the lists, and those fortunate to find employment for a day had to 
give the subcontractor approximately a third of their earnings, 
leaving them with barely a rouble to take home. According to 1904 
data, day laborers earned an average daily wage of 60 kopecks to a 
rouble. After a long day's work, they returned to await payment at 
the tavern where their subcontractor conducted business; settling up 
often took until r o pm68 Given the extraordinary number of wasted 
hours, it is not surprising that many day laborers lacked the 
inclination to work every day. Even if they so desired, competition 
from other job seekers reduced their chances of finding work. 
Although some day laborers lived in apartments with their 
families or other workers, many found their wages inadequate to rent 
a room or even a corner in an apartment and were forced to seek 
shelter in one of the crowded flophouses (nochlezhnye dorna) that 
speckled the harbor area and poor neighborhoods of Odessa. At the 
turn of the century several thousand people - mostly Great Russian 
by nationality - slept in flophouses, with a sizable majority of them 
living in such accommodations for over a year and nearly half for 
over three years. In other words, many day laborers had become 
permanent denizens of night shelters. Indeed, many frequented the 
same flophouses day after day and even had their favorite sleeping 
corners. 69 
Conditions in the night shelters were abominable. Night shelters 
were breeding grounds for infectious diseases and offered the lodger 
only a filthy straw mattress on a cold, damp, and hard asphalt 
floor. 70 Often they lacked heat and washing facilities. Their patrons 
usually bathed in a canal filled with the warm, runoff water from the 
municipal electric plant, since no public baths existed in the port 
district. 71 Of the nine night shelters located in the harbor district, 
seven were privately owned and two were operated by the city. 
Conditions in the city-run shelters were better than those found in 
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privately owned flophouses, since city shelters generally provided 
bathing facilities and free medical care and operated cafeterias. In 
addition, the city ran a day shelter that attracted daily up to 500 
persons who took advantage of its showers, kitchen, and lending 
library. 72 
Alcoholism was another contributing factor in the entry of day 
workers into the world of flophouses. As one twenty-year-old 
explained, he began sleeping in night shelters" because of vodka." 73 
Contemporary observers often characterized residents of flophouses 
as lacking the resolve to lift themselves out of these degrading 
surroundings. Like many other workers, they drowned their sorrows 
in drink. Observers also commented that many day laborers worked 
only in order to earn enough money to get drunk. The system of 
subcontracting encouraged heavy drinking since it invariably took 
place in taverns. 74 Drinking not only diminished the chances of 
finding work, but also robbed day workers of the motivation to work 
on a permanent basis. Consequently, many of them could not 
disengage themselves from the crippling world of vodka and were 
content to work one or two days a week, spending the rest of the 
week drinking. As one observer noted: "Hope has died in their 
hearts - apathy has replaced it. " 75 
Dependent on the activity of the port for their livelihood, day 
laborers in general and dockworkers in particular were usually the 
first workers to feel the impact of downturns in the economy. During 
such times, lacking even the few kopecks that night shelters charged, 
they often slept under the night-time sky or in open barrels at 
dockside. 76 Hunger was such a constant factor in the day laborers' 
lives that they used a broad range of colorful phrases to express its 
intensity. For example, "simple hunger" (gekoklzt prostoi ) referred to 
hunger caused by not eating for one day. "Deadly hunger" (gekoklzt 
smertel' nyi) lasted somewhat longer, and "hunger with a vengeance" 
(gekoklzt s raspiatiem) was of "indeterminate length, whole weeks, 
months, in short, hunger which has no foreseeable end. " 77 
Many day laborers never established secure family and social 
roots and were never fully integrated into urban, working-class life. 
Even though many had lived in Odessa for years, their lives had a 
marginal and rootless quality. The faces of their workmates, 
employers, and those who slept near them in the night shelter 
changed frequently, even daily, and the lack offulltime employment 
and permanent lodgings limited their opportunities to form 
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friendships and establish bonds either at home or at work. Even for 
day laborers who enjoyed the comforts and security of steady work 
through membership in a work gang and apartment living, life in 
Odessa had an ephemeral quality, since many of them were seasonal 
migrants who never settled permanently in Odessa. Day laborers 
found it difficult though not impossible under such circumstances to 
promote and defend their interests in an organized and sustained 
manner. 
Observers referred to day laborers as "p ac ful and b lieved 
that the "day laborer is not terrifying when h ' had his fill; when 
the port is busy, this Odessan is calm. 78 This omm nt's implication 
is clear, however: day laborers could be less than law-abiding and 
peaceful during times of economic hardship. An under u1T nt of 
tension and discontent was clearly visible among day laborers, and 
there were times when they gave ent to their frustrations and anger 
in fits of rage and fury. At the bei ht of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, 
for example, r enlful that soldiers were assigned the task of loading 
ships de tined for the Far East, day laborers reacted to their 
displacement by attacking J ws and stores owned by both Jews and 
Gentile . 79 In 1905 day laborers exploded twice, first in June, when 
Jews were not singled out as targets of their wrath, and th n a ain 
in October, this time however with anti-Jewish violence r aching 
alarming proportions. Quite clearly, lhen day laborers did not 
follow a preordained path that inevitably led to pogromist actions, 
and their occupation and so ial characteristics lack foolproof 
predi tive values of behavior. Day laborers did not always direct 
their ir towardJews; om times they channeled their anger toward 
those possessing wealth and property regardless of ethnic or religious 
background. Day laborers did not consistently follow a conservative 
pro-government line. To be sure, members of the Moscow Customs 
Artel took part in the patrioti proces ion and pogromi t violence, 
but they also were caught up in the movement to challeng 
employers for improved working conditions. For instance, in May 
several hundred of them conducted an ord rly and successful trike 
for higher wages and shorter workdays, and in November they again 
struck over low pay, hours, hou ing allowance, and the right to select 
deputies who would b empowered to have final say in the levying 
of fines. This labor activism continued into 1906. 80 It took a 
conjuncture of certain social, economic, and political factors to 
transform a riot into an anti-Jewish pogrom. 
The pogrom of 1905 in Odessa 
In Odessa pogromist behavior had both an ethnic and a class basis 
that reflected the complex relationship of long-term ethnic antago-
nisms, the structure of Odessa's economy, and short-term political 
catalysts. The heritage of antisemitism made Odessa particularly 
ripe for a pogrom: the legal disabilities and mistreatment endured 
by the Jews of Russia engendered an attitude that accepted 
antisemitism and tolerated anti-Jewish violence. The domination of 
the grain trade by Jewish merchants predisposed many dockworkers 
against Jews, whom they conveniently saw as the source of the 
troubles, particularly the lack of jobs, besetting the city and 
themselves. Consequently, when day laborers sought an outlet for 
their frustrations and problems, they focused on Jews. Without 
taking into account the hostile, anti-Jewish atmosphere in Odessa, 
we cannot understand why Russian day laborers at times of 
economic distress chose not to attack other Russian workers who 
competed with them for scarce jobs or Russian employers, but 
instead indiscriminately lashed out at all Jews, regardless of whether 
they were job competitors. 
Similarly, the depressed state of the Odessa economy also helped 
set the stage for the outbreak of the pogrom. The straitened 
economic circumstances of 1905 produced a situation especially ripe 
for anti-Jewish violence. Many day laborers were out of work and, 
owing to their lack of skills, unlikely to find employment. 
Unemployment and economic competition contributed to a growing 
sense of frustration and despair among many pogromists and helped 
channel their anger against Jews. Yet economic problems alone do 
not explain why Russian day workers decided to attack Jews in 
October 1905. In June, for example, dockworkers and day laborers 
exploded in a fit of wanton rage, but chose to challenge established 
authority by destroying the harbor. In October these same workers 
directed their hostility and frustration toward Jews, although 
material conditions had not substantially changed. 
What had changed since the June disorders was the political 
atmosphere which had become polarized and more radicalized. The 
heated revolutionary climate of mid-October precipitated the 
pogrom. Many participants in the patriotic procession of I 9 October, 
especially members of the Black Hundreds and other organized 
right-wing groups, undoubtedly marched in order to express their 
support of the autocracy and disapproval of the October Manifesto. 
They even tried to recruit other Odessans, particularly day laborers 
I~ 
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and dockworkers, by appealing to age-old fears and suspicions that 
Jews threatened the purity of Russian Orthodoxy and contaminated 
the social fabric. Some workers, as one Social Democratic activist 
speaking about the labor movement in r 903 stated, feared that 
"they would be replaced by Jews and be left without work" in the 
vent ofpoliti a l r volution. 1 And still others undoubtedly second d 
th pinion or on Odessan who aid the 18 ctob r c 1 brations 
brought "tear to his eye ' a h regarded lh m a insulting and 
disgrac ful. 82 
Y t many lh r and do kworker in parti ular, 
w r le s nti d by politi s than by the v dka and mon y that tbe 
poli e reportedly oflered. rtainly not aU m mb 1 f th pro ssion 
and pogromi t n 'Cessaril y lood n th extrem r.ighl of the political 
p trum, as the d kwo1·k rs and day labor rs' riot in Jun strongly 
suggests. For th politicall apathetic and unawar , th lruagJ 
b tween revolution and rea tion wh.i h inspir d lhe more p liti ally 
consciou played a ondary if not n gHgibJ rol . Many may not 
hav intended l a ault J ews and d stroy th ir property but w r 
prov ked by the sho tin and bomb-throwing of th r v lutionarie 
and elf-def.en e brigad . Th a tions help to explain the irulenc 
and intensity of th pogromi t allack - especiall y by th police - on 
their vi tim . Th y w r imply aught up in th gen ral tenor of 
events and, while not being dupes or pawns manipulated by Black 
Hundred agitators, found themselves attacking Jews and their 
property in much the same way that they destroyed the harbor in 
June. In fact, pogromists looted drinking establishments, after which 
Lh y indis riminately tra hed non-Jewi h h uses, ther by dem-
onstratin £hat popu lar iolencc was not a lway dir t d against 
Jews, even in the mid t of a pogrom. 83 Thee po romi ts wer not 
a ting wiLh the mali of foreth ught but re ponding to immediate 
events Lhat channeled their anger and ire again t the J w . till 
th rs may have w I omed the pogrom b cause it afford d them the 
opportunity to vent some steam and, perhaps, acquire some booty. 
Thus, whatever the specific motivations of the various individuals 
involved in the pogrom, popular and official antisemitism and 
depressed onomi circumstan es set Lh tage by providing th 
n e sary psychological and rnaterial pre onditions, while th 
ho thou political atm pber of Odessa in 1905 h lped trigger the 
pogrom. Violen flen la ked political import and significan e and 
s rved th cau e of r> olutioo or ounter-r volution onJy wh n it 
appeared in conjunction with ther fa tor . 
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By no means did all Russian workers participate or even 
sympathize with the bloodletting. Many Russian workers enlisted in 
self-defense units, while others sheltered their Jewish neighbors and 
friends during the terror . For example, members of the sailors' union 
armed themselves and patrolled the harbor to protect Jewish 
property. After the pogrom Russian self-defensists provided financial 
aid to pogrom victims and took vigorous action to punish pogromists 
and ensure that another round of anti-Jewish violence would not 
occur. 84 Significantly, many of the Russian self-defensists were 
skilled workers from the same metalworking and machine-con-
struction plants that supplied the workers active in the organization 
of strikes and the formation of district and city strike committees, 
trade unions and, in December, the Odessa Soviet of Workers' 
Deputies. 
Two reasons can be adduced to explain the reluctance of these 
workers to join ranks with pogromists. First, skilled metalworkers 
and machinists did not face serious employment competition with 
Jews, who rarely worked in these industries. Despite the fact that 
Jews comprised a third of Odessa's population, Jews and Russians 
rarely worked in the same factory or workshop, or even as members 
of the same work gang at the dockside. In fact, Jews and Russians 
were generally not employed in the same branch of industry. The 
exception, as we have seen, was unskilled day labor. Most factory 
workers were Russians and Ukrainians; Jews formed a small 
minority. One estimate placed the number of Jews employed in 
factory production at between 4,000 and 5,000 with most working as 
unskilled and semi-skilled operatives in cork, tobacco, match, and 
candy factories. 85 
In addition, many of the factories employing skilled workers had 
a history of labor activism and a tradition of political organization 
and awareness. As I van Avdeev, a Bolshevik organizer in the railway 
workshops, told a meeting of his co-workers, the railway workshops 
formed a self-defense group during the pogrom to demonstrate that 
"the Russian worker values civil freedom and liberty and does not 
become a Black Hundred or a hooligan. On the contrary, he is 
capable of not only protecting his own interests but those of other 
citizens." 86 One Menshevik concluded that the pogrom and other 
outbursts of anti-Jewish violence was part of the government's effort 
to stem the tide of revolution by enlisting the support of" the wild, 
dark, ignorant masses of the dregs of society ... the hungry throngs of 
bosiaki."87 Workers in the railway repair shops and the Henn 
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agricultural tool and machinery plant organized self-defense groups 
and both enterprises had a long heritage of labor radicalism and a 
close association with Zubatovism and Social Democracy. The 
presence of political organizers and propagandists may have muted 
the anti-Jewish sentiment of the Russian workers in these plants and 
imparted an appreciation of working-class solidarity that tran-
scended ethnic and religious divisions. 
To sum up, the social composition of the work force helped 
determine the form and content of popular unrest. At one end of the 
occupational spectrum stood the unskilled day laborers who were 
wont to engage in campaigns of violence and destruction. At the 
other end were the skilled, more economically secure Russian 
metalworkers and machinists who tended not to participate in the 
pogrom and were more inclined than the unskilled to channel their 
protest and discontent in an organized fashion. Even though skilled 
and unskilled workers in Odessa frequently resorted to violence as a 
way to achieve their objectives, they used violence differently. The 
violence and public disorder that often accompanied strikes by 
skilled workers, as in June, could radicalize the participants and pose 
a revolutionary threat. But worker militance and social unrest also 
had reactionary consequences when Jews became the object of the 
workers' outrage and hostility . It is a commonplace that the most 
politically militant and radical of workers in both Western Europe 
and Russia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were generally not found among the poorest and most disadvantaged 
segments of the work force. Yet the unskilled and least integrated 
workers were very prone to violence - perhaps to a much greater 
extent than the better skilled and politically aware and mobilized 
workers - and this violence could contribute to or impede the 
revolutionary cause. In June a riot by the unskilled posed a serious 
threat to the authorities, but in October protest by these same 
workers effectively undercut the force and power of the revolution. 
The pogrom served the cause of political reaction and counter-
revolution by revealing how a potentially revolutionary situation 
could be defused quickly when the target of the workers' wrath was 
no longer a symbol of the autocracy. The October 1905 pogrom in 
Odessa illustrates how ethnic hostility was a potent force in workers' 
politics and served as a centrifugal force that diminished the capacity 
of Odessa workers to act in a unified fashion. The pogrom defused 
the revolutionary movement in Odessa by dampening the workers' 
The pogrom of 1905 in Odessa 281 
militancy, and despite a resurgence oflabor unrest in December, the 
fear of more bloodletting dissuaded workers from vigorously 
challenging their employers and the government like workers in 
Moscow. 
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